

No. 423

April 17, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

I asked Vilhjalmur Stefansson to prepare a memorandum for me on the Aleutian Islands, and thought you might be interested in looking at it. Also included is a memorandum on the weather and ice in the Bering Sea.

April 19, 1942

No. 423

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

I heard today that there is a rather interesting development among the German and Austrian socialists in this country. Apparently the Austrian socialists for the first time have agreed upon a declaration abandoning the idea of a union with Germany, and the German socialists in exile are considering a declaration that they did not favor retention of territory taken by the Nazis.

No. 424

April 19, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

At a dinner the other night at the Knickerbocker Club in New York, Sir Girja Bajpai spoke. He talked for an hour and a half extemporaneously. As reported he is a fluent speaker, using colorful and precise English. The guests clearly showed their approval of the speaker.

Sir Girja contended that "the jewel Japan seeks for its diadem is India, not Australia." An Indian campaign is militarily more feasible India may be reached both by land and by sea, Australia only by sea. The lines of communication to Australia are longer and far more difficult to maintain than between Japan and India. However much impaired, there is still an American fleet in the Pacific. This fleet makes vulnerable the Australian routes, much less vulnerable

the Indian routes. The United Nations still have less bases from which they can raid the Australian route. Japan has not got the Philippines. There are other bases. To India the route is clear, an inside route, easy to maintain.

India has what Japan wants. India has three-fourths of the reserve of iron ore the United States has. Indian ore is richer. India has a steel industry. Its output exceeds a million tons a year. It has the mica of the world. India has man power, both for armies and for markets.

The treasured parts of India are the most accessible to the Japanese. The iron deposits are within two hundred miles of Calcutta. The steel industry is still nearer. The topography favors invasion. The treasured parts are plains rather than mountains, covered with roads and railways.

In Australia there is not the wealth of materials or the reserve of man power. There is not a race accustomed to foreign rule. The desirable part of Australia is the most distant and the most difficult to conquer.

Sir Girja discussed the Cripps mission. His opinion was that the offer was made two years too late. Had it been made two years earlier it would have been accepted. The basic reasons for the rejection were.

1. Indian leaders did not want at this time to assume a responsibility for war and its consequences. Wars are unpopular, especially a war fought under the conditions now prevalent in India. They desired to let the British carry this burden.
2. India can gain more from the British by delaying. The British will offer so much now with the Japanese in Burma. They will offer more when the Japanese reach India.

The rejection of the Cripps offer will not materially affect the course of Indian resistance. The Moslems will fight. The Hindus will neither welcome nor bow to the Japanese. Indians know too well the record of the Japanese in Formosa, Korea and China to be deceived by the Japanese, no matter what their propaganda is.

There is no fifth column in India. Indians will not follow the pattern of the Burmese. The only real inroads made by the Japanese are not in India but in Afghanistan. There the tribes are actively with the Japanese.

The outcome of a Jap invasion is conjectural. The strength of the Chinese in their resistance to Japan is the weakness of India. Lack of railways is the weakness of India. Lack of roads and railways is the stumbling block for the Japanese in China. India has railways and roads.

India has 1,500,000 soldiers partially trained. She has a million trained troops, excluding troops on duty from Libya to India. The white troops do not number over two divisions. Readily accessible manpower is obtainable in India. The problem is equipment. The number of tanks is wholly inadequate. The same may be said as to airplanes. There are more British than American airplanes in India.

Sir Girja spoke enthusiastically in his endorsement of General Wavell. Because of the terrain and of

means of transportation, India should have a mobile army supported by adequate airpower. General Wavell is fully cognizant of this problem, and is heartily in accord with this type of defense.

The Bay of Bengal is now a Japanese sea. Sir Girja was worried concerning the fate of Madagascar.

India needs fighting planes. These planes, in his judgment, could not be flown to India at present, because of the lack of adequate air fields.

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April 20, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

On Friday April 17 the following two telegrams were sent by Henri-Haye to Vichy:

ONE: "La presse de ce matin n'a pas ete aussi violente qu'on pouvait le craindre. En annoncant a sa conference de presse, le rappel de l'Amiral Leahy a Washington, pour consultation, M. Sumner Welles a eu soin de preciser que ce rappel ne constituait pas une rupture des relations diplomatiques mais etait la breche la plus serieuse qui ait jamais ete faite dans les relations entre les deux pays depuis cent-cinquante ans.

"J'ai eu une tres longue entrevue avec M. William Bullitt qui est considere ici comme un des conseillers du President. J'ai emporte de cette conversation, la certitude que l'ancien Ambassadeur a Paris avait formellement conseille la rupture complete avec notre pays. Je crois avoir ete assez heureux pour le convaincre qu'il convenait, avant de porter un jugement definitif sur

l'action politique de Votre Excellence, d'attendre les
declarations et les actes du nouveau Gouvernement francais."

TWO: "De nombreuses depeches d'Agences de
presse ont repandu la nouvelle que les forces aeriennes,
les forces de terre et les forces de mer francaises etaient
placees sous le commandement de l'Amiral Darlan, celui-ci
ne dependant que de l'autorite du Marechal Petain.

"La nouvelle ainsi presentee ayant donne lieu
a de tres nombreux commentaires, j'attacherais du prix
a ce que Votre Excellence voulut bien me donner des
precisions sur l'etendue et la portee du commandement donne
a l'Amrial Darlan."

No. 425

April 20, 1942

12:00 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

From: William J. Donovan

The following is a summary from the weekly French directive of PWE.

1. Fundamental Objectives.

a. To hinder use of French economic resources by the enemy and to demoralize the German civil and military forces of occupation.

b. To convince the French people, especially those in the unoccupied zone that the Vichy Government cannot be considered an independent sovereign power representing France itself. The Germans foster its existence because they know they can make it do what they want in the last resort.

2. Problems. It must be born in mind: First. With the return of Laval the end of the Vichy regime as we have known it seems apparent.

a. Laval will probably go slowly, at the beginning refraining from such startling concessions to Germany as handing over the French fleet or Mediterranean bases.

b. At the start he will probably concentrate most of his attention on improving the French internal situation, liquidating his most dangerous opponents in some way or other and strengthening police precautions.

c. We may expect him to obtain some German concessions to cover his activities on their behalf. He may well obtain some relief of occupation costs and the return or conditional release of some prisoners, in order to show the relations between France and Germany in a new light.

d. Laval will not want necessarily to sever diplomatic relations with America. Bear in mind that he considers he is popular in America. He has family connections in America. Keeping France quiet during the spring campaigns and putting French economic resources and manpower at Germany's service is his immediate business.

e. Though lacking any sense of financial or political morality, nevertheless Laval brings to his task great skill in political maneuver and negotiation and great experience. His profound conviction that he is more than a match for anybody is his principal weakness. As a result he is a bad judge of public opinion.

f. Laval is fully aware that the new regime is against French public opinion. Therefore, he is ready to override public opinion, but will do utmost to avoid clash.

g. Laval is preferred to Darlan by the Germans, because Darlan's usefulness as a politician has been outlived.

Second. Strong measures to insure public order in Paris have been taken by Germany. Von Waldeck's presence, not yet confirmed, is an indication that strong repressive measures will be taken to keep Paris quiet if necessary.

Third. The wheat situation in France is becoming extremely serious. One of the main points of Vichy propaganda has been to persuade the peasants to hand over their wheat stocks.

3. Personalities.

Pétain. He should still not be attacked directly. He has been completely out-manuevered and too weak to resist. He no longer controls France.

Laval. The name Laval should as far as possible take the place of the name of Vichy, which should be named "the government of Laval." The distinction between Laval and the French people should be deepened.

Darlan. Despite his concessions he has failed to pacify France's German masters. Do not assume that he desires to hand over the French fleet to the Germans.

Dentz. The man who surrendered Paris, tried to surrender Vichy and then did not hesitate to shed Allied and French blood for the Germans.

Pecheu. He has been out-manuevered in his bid for power by police control by Laval. Do not spare Pecheu insofar as he invented the present French police system which has suppressed and muzzled the French people.

Deat. Used by Laval as the apostle of the German new order in France. Is not corrupt or venal but a Nazi and pro-German of conviction.

Doriot. Would-be leader of Nazified France. The man who wore the swastika and the German uniform.

Benoist-Mechin. Treat with contempt as the creature of the Germans and the lackey of Laval.

4. France and Vichy. Toward the situation our attitude must to a large extent be governed by that of the American government. Do not anticipate on any account what these reactions may be. Press comment of America should be used to the full. Bear in mind that to resist Laval's accession is a challenge.

5. French merchant marine. With the advent of Laval, Germany's plan for the exploitation of the French merchant fleet with the hope of provoking a major clash between the French and British fleets now becomes more dangerous than any time before.

No. 426

April 20, 1942

12:00 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

The following is from the British Political Warfare Executive Weekly Directive.

1. German home front appreciation:

a. German home propaganda.

German mind has been centered on potatoes, ration, call-up and RAF offensive, since once again there is nothing but expectation in Russia and remote Far Eastern news to relieve tension. Appearing now are the first real evidences of the moral effect of the bombings. Their major worry is the ration cut and potato shortage, explanations of which are continuing. German propaganda, true to its tradition of attack, is trying to divert attention from man power crisis by attacks on "Forms of Bureaucracy".

b. Treatment of news.

In the coming offensive, delayed only by thaw, confident expectation is expressed. The Malta raids are emphasized. Stress on Cripps failure in India. The Mediterranean is still important. Shipping sinkings are even more important. Emphasis on "discomfiture of megalomaniac Roosevelt" is another important line.

2. Strategy points:

a. General picture.

Our picture, once again, is of Germany preparing last effort to break out of Anglo-Russian net. Russia and Britain

share the chief responsibility for strategy against Germany, and America is responsible for that against Japan.

b. Malta and Mediterranean remain serious major diversion. In describing Britains part in Anglo-Russian strategy, stress that Northern route is now such a menace that Hitler has been forced to organize major Air-Naval effort to try to interrupt it.

c. Wherever possible, German manpower crisis should be repeated in the news.

d. Commandos and RAF are holding down men and equipment vitally needed in Russia. The RAF offensive is systematic attack on German war machine, both inside and outside Reich.

e. Use the French crisis to illustrate:

1. Shortage of manpower.
2. Germany's fear of intervention in the west.

As part of combined strategy designed to push Germany's manpower crisis, resistance in occupied territories should be angled. We can now leave the 1917 and use the 1918 Spring parallel.

3. Naval points:

a. Indicate forthcoming action in the Baltic and the Black Sea, by the Russians.

b. Reiterate that German subs have been frightened off the vital Atlantic routes between America and Britain and between S. Africa and Britain.

4. Military points:

- a. Libya. Rommel is faced with a time problem.
- b. Yugoslavia. Diversion of German Allied forces

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should be stressed.

c. Russia. Local Russian attacks preventing necessary German withdrawals, mud notwithstanding.

5. Talks and features.

Stop all good-humored, easy stuff and generalities about heroism, freedom etc. and present information toughly. Our talks should be suited to the severity of internal German tension.

No. 427

April 20, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

I thought that you would want to read a brief summary of a report made by Lt. Col. Clear and also Col. Brink. Clear was a man whom we took over from the Army to make a survey for our S.I.S. and S.O. operations in the Far East.

Lt. Col. Warren J. Clear

Lt. Col. Clear went to the Far East in July, 1941 on a confidential mission. He spent two months with Air Marshal Sir Brooke-Popham in Singapore, visited Thailand and French Indo-China, traversed the Netherlands East Indies to Timor and the Moluccas, arriving ultimately at Bataan in Luzon. He left Bataan, about a week before General MacArthur, and has just returned to this country after covering about 45,000 miles.

Native Disaffection in the Far East

His most general political observation was the disaffection to the cause of the United Nations on the part of all the native populations of the Far East, from India through Burma, Indo-China and Malaya. This he attributed in large measure to the pressure of the Allied blockade which had deprived the native of his cheap cotton clothes, his cheap shoes, and canned goods. His average income of about

\$3.00 per year could scarcely acquire these articles, and now their price is prohibitive.

The Japanese, realizing the effectiveness of psychological warfare, have skillfully turned native resentment against first the United States, second Great Britain. A Japanese general in Bangkok told Col. Clear that Hitler's "New Order" was winning the war in Europe and that Japan's "Co-Prosperity Sphere" would win the war in Asia. The Japanese enforce their propaganda by the two-edged weapon of inducement and terror. In Borneo and Sarawak they permitted natives to loot and occupy Dutch houses while the Dutch were being imprisoned or killed, and they razed Penang to the ground as an object-lesson to the native on the penalties of resistance.

The Japanese had also perfected the techniques of economic penetration. In Thailand they extracted a loan of about \$11,000,000, the larger portion of which they used to purchase native rice. The Japanese had Thailand completely at their mercy.

The Battle of Malaya

During two months in Singapore, Col. Clear saw Wing Commander Darval and Air Marshal Sir Brooke-Popham and studied the defenses of Malaya. Popham agreed with Col. Clear's estimate that the British had too few troops for adequate defense, although Popham's earlier estimate had been more

optimistic.

The campaign proved that linear defense against modern tactics is inadequate. The British had assumed that their flanks on the two coasts were sufficiently protected by swamps too deep to swim and too shallow for boats. But the razing of Penang permitted the passage of Japanese boats by night behind the British flanks, and Japanese swam ashore equipped with individual inflatable belts and canvas paddles worked by the legs. Japanese deception, speed and intensive use of light automatic weapons outmaneuvered the British consistently. The trench mortar, instead of the heavier field piece, was a particularly effective weapon in all the Japanese campaigns. The individual Japanese soldier as "a single atom of force" was capable of maintaining himself for as much as two weeks. With his 25 pound tommy-gun he could carry three times as much ammunition as a British soldier and food for five days which he could supplement by forage or shooting dogs. They were resourceful soldiers, the equal of American infantry in physical toughness and training. In facing them, the British were both mentally and physically road-bound because of the sheer weight of their impedimenta and field guns.

The Battle of Bataan.

The outbreak of war caught General MacArthur's newly formed army in the process of organization. Some of the

The most effective weapon of the Japanese is the new Filipino divisions were actually in the process of induction. They broke badly under the initial Japanese attacks after the landings at Lingayen, and the northern army was pushed rapidly back. When the Japanese forces pushed north from the landing at Legaspi in the south, MacArthur had no option but to declare Manila an open city and retire his small army to Bataan in accordance with plans made years ago.

The backbone of the defense was provided by 12,000 Filipino scouts and the American force of 10,000. The main elements in the American force were the 31st Infantry, a provisional regiment of sailors, and a provisional regiment of Air Force converted into Infantry. It was expected that the main defense line could be held for three or four months--until food gave out or the line was flanked by sea. Actually, a line forward of the main line was held for a considerable period. Although the new Filipino divisions developed fighting ability in the Bataan area, the Japanese punched holes in their lines in night attacks, and the Filipino scouts and American forces had to be thrown in to reestablish the line. The attempt to hold the forward line would in the long run use up the backbone of the army and an orderly withdrawal to the main line of resistance was therefore executed, with the loss of only two 155 pound guns which could not be got through the swamps. There was no Japanese attack on the new line until it had been effectively consolidated three days after the retirement.

The most effective weapon of the Japanese is the 90 mm. trench mortar, which is easily portable and fires a destructive shell. The American forces had some 81 mm. guns but the ammunition was in Cebu. Colonel Clear recommended the use of both 90 mm. mortars and 75 mm. howitzers for equipment of forces in Australia.

The Japanese have developed the art of pursuit to a fine point, picking up the weapons of their enemy on the way in the certainty of eventually picking up the necessary ammunition for it. They use their own ammunition until it is gone and then have available their enemy's stock. In the same way they tow captured field artillery for days until their planes spot ammunition dumps to supply them. They carry extra distributors and tires for abandoned trucks. Their armies in Malaya, Java, and Luzon seem well trained in the utilization of enemy material.

Their coordination of air and land forces is superb, and they are thinking way ahead of their enemies in this respect. Both in Malaya and in Luzon they easily knocked out the few airfields from which planes could operate, and so immobilized the air power of their enemies. Once they had conquered Manila, they developed fifty landing strips separated by a few miles in that area, and fifty more in the area of Clark Field to provide the proper dispersal of their planes and equipment. A captured Japanese aviator emphasized the contrast when he said that his experience bombing the American fields had been "delightful". If he missed the field he was certain to hit a hangar or a repair shop.

Colonel Brink

Colonel Brink went to the Far East as United States Army observer and reported in February, 1940, to British Headquarters in Singapore. He remained there in contact with Admiral Layton and Air Marshall Sir Brooke-Popham, and later with General Wavell through the Malaya Campaign. With the disastrous conclusion of that campaign, Wavell took him to Java as a member of his staff in charge of war plans, specifically to devise plans for a counteroffensive. With the fall of Java, command was left to the Dutch and Colonel Brink with other American officers of his staff got the last boat from a Japanese Harbor which was destroyed the next day. The ship's boilers blew up but a British cruiser got it safely to port in India.

Colonel Brink then visited the Burma "front". He said "It takes two opposing forces to make a front" but since he could never find the Jap lines, the term was used figuratively. He visited General Cowan's 14th Division of the 5th Army, whose skillful plans to ambush a Japanese force were frustrated by the treachery of a Burmese division. The Burmese were supposed to be part of the ambush, but when the time came to attack, refused, and later joined the Japanese. Subsequently he went into the South Shan States to visit the 6th Chinese Army of 26,000--composed of three divisions of about 7,000 men each plus about 6,000 so-called "army troops." He left the Burma front to return to the United States only recently.

The Campaign in Malaya

Colonel Brink scouted the theories of the "Monday morning quarterbacks" that there had been lack of energy and morale in the British military defense of Malaya. A small British force, without adequate air power, hampered by the lethargy of the civilian government, fought doggedly and desperately to the end against superior forces, superior tactics and coordination, and against Japanese command of the air, all aided by effective 5th column activity.

The British Commander had asked for three army corps and got three weak divisions. He asked for 556 planes and got 200, of which 50 never left the ground and 75 only were fighters. The fighters were "Sears-Roebuck" Buffaloes, handled with heroism but futility by British aviators, and hopelessly outclassed by Japanese Zeros and 97's. The Blenheim bombers were helpless without fighter protection as were the "Prince of Wales and Repulse" which ventured against Japanese air power with the protection of a single P.B.Y. patrol plane. This was the protection that the Naval Command asked for when they were approached on the subject by the Air Command. The British in two years of fighting had not learned the lesson of vulnerability of battle ships to air power when they did not have sufficient air protection for themselves. The Dutch gave all they had to spare by sending four squadrons of planes to Malaya, but it was not enough and they were all destroyed. Two

of their squadrons in Palembang also did good work before their destruction and Dutch contribution of naval force was likewise effective within limits of its strength. The Dutch are smart fighters.

Japanese air power was overwhelming and it was aided both by 5th column activity and by the lethargy of the civil government. The government did nothing to establish an effective air raid warning system until a military test by four old Blenheims caught every British fighter on the ground. Popham insisted on an adequate observer system and secured great improvement. Yet there was treachery in the system and 5th columnists developed a signalling system to aid the Japanese flyers. The Japanese were guided down the west coast at night to Singapore by lights and in Singapore itself a light guided them to strategic points in the defense area. A Japanese radio station operated to the very end at Singapore, and though the code was solved, the station was never located despite the use of direction finders and employment of a regiment of soldiers with 100 boats. With such assistance and with the aid of perfect radio communication between the Japanese air and land forces, Japanese air power was invincible. In a visit to the Australian General Gordon Bennett at the front, Colonel Brink saw 500 cars and trucks bombed off the road in a 100 mile stretch.

Against Japanese resources, the British could only muster from 40,000 to 50,000 men after the losses sustained in the Malayan battle for the final defense of Singapore and not the 85,000 that was commonly reported. The army

fought hard, but its severe casualties during the retreat broke down the entire command structure, so that it arrived in Singapore a disorganized mass. One unit, the Argyles and Southern Highlanders, 850 strong when it first made contact with the Japanese at the border, was reduced to 90 men and two officers during its 500 mile retreat and ultimately to 45 men and one officer when it entered Singapore. Manchesters, East Surreys, and Gurkhas lost about 50% of their effectives. Under these circumstances demolition of bridges was not effectively carried out and the causeway to Singapore Island was not blown up, except for a few holes easily repaired. An Indian officer cut off behind the Japanese lines ultimately turned up in Singapore with the report that the Japanese had found many bridges intact behind the retreating British forces. In one case where a bridge had been completely destroyed, the Japanese repaired it in a day and crossed it in time to surprise and destroy an entire British artillery regiment. All the way into Singapore it was the same story of resourceful Japanese forces hitting hard and fast simultaneously at front and flank, employing surprise and perfect coordination between units by radio air-ground communication.

Much of the British plight was due to their faulty strategic conceptions, but probably even more to the failure of the civilian government to perform its proper functions of preparing organized positions for the Army to retire to. The

faulty strategic conceptions were illustrated by the elaborate defenses at Mersing in the northeast where pill boxes and barbed wire were supposed to trap Japanese forces as they landed. The Japanese characteristically came in behind Mersing defenses and the British had provided no "switch-positions", but even more serious was the failure of the civilian government to clear fields and prepare trenches to serve as defenses for the retreating Army.

It was the same story with the railways. 80% of the engineers quit their job and roughly 50% of the lesser railway officials, leaving a top echelon of railway executives and a very few men below. Most of the operating personnel which quit were native, although the native Chinese proved to be a loyal and faithful element both in the air raid protection organization and on the railways. The failure of the civilian government to deal with this native problem was the occasion for Colonel Brink's remark "you can't win the war with slaves." Another important symbol of British civilian failure was the refusal in London to permit the cutting down of rubber trees which provided magnificent cover for Japanese infantry and a perfect haven for Japanese snipers. In the face of civilian failure, the British Army had no organized positions ready to sustain them and their lines were flanked and infiltrated by Japanese all the way to Singapore.

In Singapore it was the same story. The civilian government had only belatedly prepared slit-trenches for shelter for the civilian population. The work was not begun until bombings had actually occurred. Duff Cooper arrived from England to stir the local government into action and he restored a modified form of martial law with beneficial effects. Yet the population of Singapore continued to act as if there was no war and there occurred between 5,000 and 10,000 civilian casualties.

It was not surprising that the disorganized mass of the Allies when they arrived in Singapore were unable to stem the Japanese advances. Australians on the west of the island, British and India on the east were still driven back behind the last reservoir of water and there was literally no water available for the large local population or for the army. A group of Australians ripped off their identification tags and commandeered one of last ships to get away. The fact that Australians who had proved themselves among the finest troops of the country during this war could be disorganized to this extent was eloquent testimony to the complete breakdown of the command structure in the Army.

Plans for a Counteroffensive

In Java Colonel Brink worked out plans for a counter-offensive which were approved by General Wavell. They provided secondary action from Australia and from Java, if possible,

but mainly an offensive from Burma to destroy Japanese control in Indo-China. The advantages of the plan were chiefly its independence of overseas communication and the complete protection of the land and air routes required for supply. The offensive was to utilize primarily Chinese troops to advance from Yunnan to Hanoi and also from Burma. The Chinese were willing but the British refused to permit Chinese troops to enter Burma.

The Burmese Campaign

Colonel Brink painted a discouraging picture of the British situation in Burma. The British suffered a serious reverse in Sit-taung losing 50% of their 17th Division. Some three brigades were fighting an effective rear guard action on the east bank of the Sit-taung when a British engineer blew up the bridge behind them. Many were drowned crossing the river, and all equipment was left behind.

The native Burmese are aiding the Japanese Army. They desire independence and they are meat for Japanese propaganda. The Japanese supply them with money and they have formed a "free Burmese" Army to fight the British.

The only hope for the Burmese situation is American air power both for combat and for communication. Rangoon has been eliminated as a port of entry and the Lashio railhead is now being bombed. The Japanese made a devastating attack on the American volunteer group airdrome at Magive hitting practically every plane, every gas supply tank, and every machine shop because

of the numerical superiority of Jap air power in Burma. The volunteer group got only three of its planes away. Of 120 Hurricanes sent out by the British, 109 have been destroyed. Yet Colonel Brink came away with the feeling that the American volunteer group if adequately supplied and reinforced could help turn the tide. Having discounted in advance the publicity they have received, he reported that they are virtually a group of supermen with the spirit, ingenuity, efficiency, and cooperation of a college team. Their commander, Chennault, he described as one of the finest leaders of men he had ever seen. The AVG have shot down some 200 Japanese planes of all types for loss of only two or three of their own. Admiration of the RAF for the AVG knows no bounds and one RAF officer described with pride the spectacle of the AVG squadron climbing into the clouds to attack a Japanese bombing squadron above and shortly after the spectacle of six Japanese bombers fluttering down out of the clouds.

The only hope for both Burma and India in the opinion of Colonel Brink is American power and particularly air power. He described the British as beaten and groggy, slow to adapt to the new conditions of warfare. He felt that they had not yet learned the lessons of air power and predicted further loss of British ships through lack of air protection. He said it's up to the United States and there is only about a month to go in Burma.

No.428

April 20, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

I think that you would want to be advised of the following:

Arrangements are being made to facilitate the return to China of the Reverend Father Charles L. Meeus, who, it is believed, can render a public service in strengthening Chinese confidence in the United States. Father Meeus was born a Belgian. After a number of years of missionary work in China, he became a Chinese citizen. He speaks excellent Chinese, and more than once has been called upon by the Chinese government to perform morale work among the Chinese people.

Twice before, in 1937 and 1939, Father Meeus has visited the United States on unofficial goodwill missions. He proposes, upon returning to China, to carry to the Chinese a picture of the United States which will increase their confidence that this country will remain in the war to the finish, and with China and its other associates, defeat the Axis powers.

The following is an excerpt contained in a letter which we have just received from Father Meeus:

"As regards the trip itself and the pictures of the United States I intend to present in Chungking, here are the decisions we have taken:

"1. I accept with gratitude the necessary priorities that you will provide me with for accommodation on ships, planes, and other means of communications for which your office will book me on this trip to Chungking.

"2. I shall pay myself all the expenses of such a trip, including fare, meals and sundries, expecting you to bill me for the booking of my passage.

"3. Your office will provide me with the facts that you wish China to be acquainted with through myself in Chungking.

"4. The sponsor of my trip and of the work I shall accomplish in China for mutual goodwill between China and America will be the Catholic Church, through Bishop Bernard J. Sheil."

No. 429

April 20, 1942
6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

I think you should be advised of the attached information at once which we have received from our man in Tangier.

I have previously informed you of Lt. Colonel Eddy's activities in North Africa. Eddy is a Marine officer, a former Brigade Intelligence officer, and more recently President of Hobart College. His reports have indicated that the situation in French Morocco is becoming hourly more critical. He believes, as do others with whom he is in touch, that we have many friends among certain groups there, and those friends have asked for support in the form of money and war material.

Murphy of the State Department is working closely with Eddy. This whole matter has been placed before the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a full exposition of the situation.

Soon the German military and naval attaches and staff will arrive in Tangier. German Admiral Canaris is en route to Tangier on a secret mission. He will remain concealed in the consulate here and will be incognito. This week Herr Ried, the German Minister who will succeed Consul Noehring, is arriving. Other recent arrivals in Tangier are Roederer who arrived April 15th and was met at the airport with ceremony, and Max Franz Bach, fourth Gestapo paymaster, who arrived February 24th. Two Gestapo agents have arrived from Moroc for the specific purpose of watching Americans in Tangier. Tomorrow six German agents are arriving by plane. Axis plots to attack members of our Legation have been intercepted here by reliable sources.

No. 430

April 20, 1942
6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

According to information received from the British Political Warfare Executive:

(a) Mussolini has been forced to request an immediate loan of wheat from Hungary. This is to be repaid in kind at the earliest possible moment.

(b) It is plainly indicated by Laval's proclaimed intention to maintain the French Empire intact that, so far as the Mediterranean is concerned, there will be a maneuver to exploit Italy's difficulties in order to establish Laval's position with the people of France. Note that for three days after Laval's return to power the Rome radio refrained from mentioning him.

(c) It is evidently believed by certain strategists that Laval's return to power is a move by Hitler to secure the western flank before launching any counter-offensive against Russia. It is thought that while exacting from France the greatest possible degree of

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collaboration, he is imposing upon Mussolini another postponement of the territorial claims for which Italy is supposed to have gone to war.

No. 431
April 21, 1942
8:30 A. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

Upon a report that may be considered as good, but not to be relied on in every respect, the following would appear:

A. GERMAN ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES IN PORTUGAL

The head of the German espionage organization in Portugal is Albert von Karsthof of the German Legation.. His agents cross the Spanish frontier both legally and illegally. He has a network of spies throughout North and South America and the Portuguese Colonies, who communicate with Germany through Lisbon by wireless, secret ink and microphotography, while their couriers regularly use Portuguese post boxes (the names and addresses of these are available).

Working under von Karsthof is Fritz Cramer, also of the German Legation, in regular contact with German agents from Tangier, Paris, Madrid and elsewhere.

Both von Karsthof and Cramer maintain direct touch with agents in the United Kingdom and in the United States. Among these agents are Erno Fuleiki, a Hungarian citizen, and Cornelius Woult, a Dutch national (who was found at Bermuda in possession of a wireless transmitter). Another

agent is Otto Merckl, who, unlike von Karsthof and Cramer, does not possess any diplomatic cover. He is known to have sent agents to the United Kingdom.

Apart from these general activities, von Karsthof is known to have suborned Portuguese citizens in the Colonies to report on internal political affairs. Under his direction, movements of Portuguese troops and transports are regularly reported by clandestine methods.

All these activities are organized under the general direction of von Karsthof. There is, however, another organization working independently in Portugal and reporting on internal Portuguese affairs direct to Himmler. This organization has sufficient ramifications to be able to report conversations between the President of the Council and the British Ambassador. There is also evidence that it has been engaged in a conspiracy against the Brazilian Government, in association with Salgado and others, the negotiations being carried out on Portuguese soil.

B. GERMAN ESPIONAGE IN PORTUGAL AGAINST THE ALLIES

These activities are mainly directed to espionage against British and Allied Shipping.

The director of these activities is Hans Bendixon, who regularly reports on shipping movements, both those of Atlantic convoys and those of ships in Portuguese waters.

His reports are transmitted direct to the headquarters in France of the Luftwaffe, which takes immediate offensive action. Allied shipping losses in the eastern Atlantic have been traced to this reporting service.

Bendixon, who is frequently in Madrid, has as his principal local agent in Portugal one Kuno Weltzien. The latter is a partner in the firm of Cudell & Weltzien, Ltda., Krupp's agents in Portugal. Weltzien has an extensive net of agents through whom he operates, including such Portuguese nationals as Mario Esteves Schumann, Candido Lacombe Raposo, and Carlos Santos, all of Lisbon. These men have the task of recruiting agents and obtaining reports from them in ships and in Portuguese Colonies. Their activities are directed against British shipping.

C. GERMAN SABOTAGE ORGANIZATION IN PORTUGAL

For the past nine months, Lieut. Colonel Hans Joachim Rudolph, head of the German sabotage organization in the Iberian Peninsula, has been directing operations on Portuguese soil against Allied shipping. He has recently received instructions to intensify sabotage activities in Portugal.

One of the primary activities of this organization is the endeavor to place bombs on British and Allied ships and for this purpose there are known to have been persistent attempts (which continue) to bribe Portuguese stevedores to

engage in this work.

It is known that Lieut. Colonel Rudolph and his organization are directly responsible for the loss of the S. S. "Greihead" off Melilla, and of the trawler "Erin" in Gibfaltar, and for many unsuccessful attempts of this kind. The facilities for residence and travel in the Peninsula afforded to this man, and the facilities for visiting him that are extended to his subordinates in Spain, constitute a grave danger to British ship and their crews.

D. GERMAN INFLUENCE UPON THE INTERNATIONAL SECTION OF THE POLICIA DE VIGILANCIA E DEFESA DO ESTADO

Captain Paulo Cumano, of the International Section of the Policia de Vigilancia e Defesa do Estado, is known, as long ago as last August, to have been in contact with von Karsthof, head of the German espionage system in Portugal (see A above). He is also known to be in regular contact with Kuno Weltzien (see B above). There is evidence that he has employed informers to obtain information requested by the Germans.

E. GERMAN ILLICIT COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES IN PORTUGAL

The general attitude of the Germans towards Portugal and Portuguese economy is summarized in a telegram dated May 2, 1941, sent from Berlin to SOFINDUS, Madrid, in connection with the schedule of activities planned for "FLOSS" (the nom

de plume of the representative for Portugal of Sofindus). The text of this telegram reads: "Removal of all raw materials in Portugal is primary task of Floss".

These activities comprise the organization of smuggling of foodstuffs out of Portugal on a large scale, not only to Spain but for forwarding to Germany and Italy. As an example, in the Elvas district this smuggling is organized by Herr Otto, the German Consul at Badajoz. He visits Elvas almost every day with an entourage of Spaniards and Germans occupying five or six motor cars, issuing orders and making payments to his agents. On returning to Badajoz in the evenings the cars are openly loaded with foodstuffs. The Portuguese frontier police have done nothing to stop this.

Large scale smuggling of this kind is aided by the storage of commodities whose export is prohibited in specially selected warehouses. As an example, the extensive storehouses owned by Manuel B. Viças, Ltda., at Vilar Formosa, Elvas, Beira, Oliveirinha, etc., are used to store, for subsequent export to the Axis, commodities such as cotton yarn, hides, leather, minerals, foodstuffs, edible oils and wool.

Wolfram is also known to be smuggled out of Portugal by illicit methods. The Italian Legation is one of the places where it is stored before shipment, and as late as the middle of March, 1942, that Legation exported six tons

of wolfram (together with a substantial quantity of food-stuffs) by trucks bearing C. D. plates. A fleet of 25 trucks, all bearing C. D. plates, is employed in this smuggling by the Italian Legation.

Among Portuguese officials who work in cooperation with the organizers of these smuggling activities is Senhor Neves, the Chief of Police at Evora.

S-22

April 21, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

The following message was sent by Admiral Darlan to Henri-Haye on Saturday, April 18.

"No. 954 Je me refere a votre telegramme 1303, concernant les correspondances fraduleuses signalees part le Departement d'Etat sur la ligne Casablanca-Fort de France.

"J'ai donne les instructions les plus precises et les plus rigoureuses

1. Au Resident General au Maroc.
2. A l'Amiral Robert, Haut Commissaire aux Antilles,
3. Aux Commandant de la Marine a Casablanca et a Fort de France.

d'Exercer une surveillance des plus completes et des plus minutieuses sur les passagers et sur les bagages, tant au depart de Casablanca, qu'a l'arrivee a Fort de France, a l'effet de deceler toute fraude possible dans les transports de correspondance.

"Veuillez informer de ces mesures le Department d'Etat en l'assurance que le Gouvernement français fait tout ce qui est en son pouvoir pour repondre aux craintes qu'il a exprimees et qui, d'ailleurs, autant que nous sachions, ne correspondant jusqu'a a aucun fondement."

The following is the text of a cable received by Marshall Petain on April 18 from M. Charles Peyrouton, French Ambassador at Buenos Aires:

"Partisan resolu de la Revolution nationale, sous votre haute et indiscutee direction, il ne m'est pas possible de continuer a exercer mes fonctions sous la nouvelle autorite a qui vous avez confie les responsabilites gouvernementales.

"J'ai donc l'honneur par le present telegramme de vous adresser ma demission. C'est avec un grand orgueil que j'ai represente la France et votre personne aupres du gouvernement ami, de la Republique Argentine. Vous pouvez avoir l'assurance que je conserverai un souvenir emu de la confiance que vous avez bien voule m'accorder, en meme temps qu'un devouement complet a votre personne et a la partie."

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 904001
By MAN/ONE MABA, Date 2/18/72

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

No. 432
April 21, 1942
8:30 A. M.

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SENSITIVE INFORMATION DELETED C/A 1.3(a)(3)(4)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

All I know about Odo is this: He is a Benedictine monk from the Monastery of Beuron, not a Franciscan. It happens that he is now living at the Franciscan Monastery, Quincy Street, Brookland, Washington, D. C.

The Catholic intellectuals here who know him consider him an outspoken enemy of the Nazis. It was because of this fact that he was sent by his Abbott to Switzerland about 1935. While there, he was used on occasion by Pius XI, who liked him, as liaison between the Vatican and the Church in Germany. He came here about September, 1940. He has been of real aid to refugees, Christians and Jews, but it is said that refugee agencies don't approve of him.

His best friends say, however, that he is characterized by a peculiar temperament. This is attributed to a disease of the thyroid. He is easily moved to anger. It is said that this thyroid condition explains vivid and unreliable imagination, which causes him to give exaggerated reports in which he believes. They say, further, that even when his reports are based on reliable sources, it is always well to go to those sources in order to determine how much of what he has said is real and how much is fantasy.

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Date 4/18/91

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May 8, 1942

DECLASSIFIED
Authority <u>NND 904001</u>
By <u>MEMPHIS</u> MARA, Date <u>2/24/02</u>

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CIA 1.3(9)(4) (7 PAGES)

No. 433

April 21, 1942

8:30 A. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

There has just been brought to my attention the Ghika - Prince Otto matter in the State Department. I immediately sent my personal assistant to the State Department and instructed him to relate fully exactly what occurred.

You will recall that I did not make the request to you about Otto, but called the matter to your attention at the instance of Bill Bullitt. When you indicated that you wished nothing done, nothing was done and nothing has been said. I discussed the matter with no one and considered the incident closed. As I told you, I had always refused to have anything to do with Otto, likewise I have always refused to see Eckhardt, whose name was mentioned at the State Department today in connection with the matter. I only saw Otto for about five

minutes with Bullitt on this one occasion.

The story which came to the State Department could not have come from us.

W. J. Donovan

The Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has asked us if, instead of using our facilities and operating staff for presenting pictorially the strategic problems of the war in our building to be erected, we would be willing to set up and operate this in the building of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I told them that I would be very glad to do this and would be prepared to proceed immediately. I assured that you have no objection and assure you that we will make available for them everything that we had intended setting up in our own building.

This confirms your own forecast in anticipating the use of this room for this purpose.

No. 434

April 21, 1942
6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

The Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has asked me if, instead of using our facilities and operating staff for presenting pictorially the strategical problems of the war in our building to be erected, we would be willing to set up and operate this in the building of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I told them that I would be very glad to do this and would be prepared to proceed immediately. I assume that you have no objection and assure you that we will make available for them everything that we had intended setting up in our own building.

This confirms your own foresight in anticipating the use of and need for this a long time ago.

No. 435

April 21, 1942
6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

Would you think it fantastic, and if not, is it feasible to have someone who is close at hand in Vichy talk with Darlan?

His nose must be greatly out of joint at this moment. That being true, would it be possible to suggest something along the line of putting him in command of that particular unit of an Allied fleet. Men disappointed in their ambitions have gone much further than that.

No. 436

April 21, 1942
6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

You will recall that some time ago I sent you some communications from Mr. Malcolm R. Lovell relating to interviews he had with Dr. Hans Thomsen before our entry into the war.

I now send you a letter which I have just received from Mr. Lovell relating to his recent conversation with Colonel Bertrand-Vigne, Counsellor of the French Embassy.

MALCOLM R. LOVELL
26 EAST 38TH STREET
NEW YORK

April 17th, 1942.

Dear Colonel Donovan,

I talked today with Colonel Bertrand-Vigne, Counsellor of the French Embassy. He had phoned to me while he was recently at Oyster Bay, visiting with Mrs. Theodore Roosevelt, Sr., but I had been unable to see him while he there. As you know, Colonel Bertrand Vigne and I are old and close friends. Since, if Henry-Haye is "recalled for consultation", Colonel Bertrand Vigne will be Charge d'Affaires, these remarks may have interest for the State Department.

Colonel Bertrand Vigne said, "We believe the war in Europe will be over this year (1942). The cataclysmic assault, when it comes, will be so overwhelming that nothing will be able to stand in its path."

"Russia will make peace this year. She will say that, "Britain and the United States have done little of importance and have suffered defeat after defeat, while she, Russia, has borne the brunt of the war. She has defeated the Germans during the winter (so she will claim) and has proved her valor and courage. Failure of her allies makes it necessary for her to arrange a peace." "

Col. Bertrand Vigne continued, " All the blame for this peace will be placed by Russia on the shoulders of Great Britain and the United States."

Cordially yours

Malcolm Lovell

Colonel William J. Donovan
Co-ordinator of Information
Bureau of Co-ordination of Information
Washington, D.C.



No. 437

April 21, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

You might be interested in looking at the attached memorandum which is an account of the relations of General Robert Odic with the Free French and deGaulle.

General Robert Odic, formerly head of the French Air Forces in North Africa under Weygand, was interviewed by Mr. John Wiley in his office on Tuesday, April 7. The General had come to the United States in November, 1941, on the invitation of United States officials. When the resignation of General Weygand was announced, Odic issued a statement declaring his allegiance to the Free French forces. Shortly thereafter he left for England, to talk with deGaulle and to observe the situation in his movement. His return here was delayed by difficulties of transportation, and he arrived back in the United States on April 4. The following is the substance of the report which he gave to Mr. Wiley, setting forth his reactions to the London scene. It supplements the information contained in the memorandum of April 9 to Colonel Donovan and was prepared before the General had any knowledge of the change in the government at Vichy.

1. General Odic's attitude toward Vichy

When he made his declaration of allegiance to the forces of the Free French on November 29, 1941, it was not the act of one who repented of having followed the politics of Vichy. Rather, it affirmed the continuance of a practical course of resistance to Germany which until then had been carried out in an area where France, militarily vanquished, had nevertheless been able to invoke the clauses of the armistice to defend such independence as was left to her, and in particular to maintain the fleet and so much of the Empire as was outside the grasp of Germany.

General Odic had been in a position to observe the evolution of Nazi pressure on Vichy, and the effect of Nazi propaganda on certain members of the government. The resignation of

General Weygand, under whose orders he had been serving for a year, and the announcement of the next interview between Marshal Petain and Chancellor Hitler seemed to him characteristic events which left no doubt that the party favoring an alliance with Germany had gained the ascendancy. The irremediable he feared, was about to be committed. In these circumstances it seemed indispensable that French public opinion should compel, or at least facilitate, the Government's retreat from its posture of abdication.

The General was convinced that this manifestation was not in vain, since the Hitler-Petain interview was postponed and then abandoned. The delays thus won, moreover, made possible the evolution of opinion following the Russian shift from the defensive to the offensive and the entrance of the United States into the War.

The Vichy government, as a result, seemed to have returned to a firmer attitude toward German demands. The problem today, as it has been all along, remains essentially that of extending this attitude, until the time when France, without committing suicide, can resume an active role in support of her former allies.

The General thus found himself, he asserted, in complete agreement with the policy of the United States toward France.

He believed that the value of that policy had been justified by its results.

2. The General's attitude toward the Free French

In going to London, General Odie had been convinced that his opinions coincided with those of General deGaulle. He supposed that de Gaulle's movement professed to be nothing else than a provisional representation of France, necessarily disavowed by the Government, but faithful to the country. France, it seemed to him, had need of such a representation - a spiritual center for its hopes of deliverance, a symbol under which the basic unity of all the French people would be fostered. France needed, moreover, an organization careful to dissipate the misconceptions which the German policy cleverly multiplies, firm in safeguarding the interests, profoundly real, which she holds in common with the United Nations.

In the General's opinion the value of such an organization was the greater as France represented more than intellectual forces, the ruin of which was to be regarded with pity. Although France, exposed without sufficient arms to the aggression of the dictators, was overcome, her youth has been regenerated. They have been recalled from a twenty years' pursuit of materialism. So it is in the occupied zone, where hate of the invader has aroused the spirit of resistance and revitalized the sentiment

of duty and the virtue of sacrifice. So it is in the unoccupied zone, where the education of youth is carried forward in a frame of questionable principles but of undoubted effectiveness. It must be remembered that the France of tomorrow will reappear in conditions analogous to those in which, after 1918, Germany found in the depths of her misery a youth movement fanatically dedicated to action, regardless of its aim.

The long-range problem which faces the democracies is to avoid those errors which might place the youth of France in the enemy camp. The more immediate objective is to keep the fleet and empire outside of the German grasp. The democracies will be wise if they provide for their own support at the time when the balance sheet of military operations shows to their favor.

3. First doubts concerning de Gaulle.

The General emphasized his desire to present facts in the strict spirit of an observer, only relating those events of which he had been an eyewitness or of whose validity he had definite proof.

He did not consider it a departure from this attitude to avow the undeniable impression, gained on his arrival in London, that de Gaullism represents something quite different from the symbol of French resistance to German oppression. Again and again he was confronted by one basic question: "Is it against Germany that de Gaulle is waging war - or is it against Vichy?"

Other questions inevitably followed:

Why had not the French people in London rallied behind General de Gaulle? Why, on the contrary, did they make so evident their estrangement from the movement, if not their frank hostility to it, that the General found it necessary to draw a sharp line between the Free French and the de Gaullists?

Why in the army itself did a number of French officers, particularly capable, prefer serving in inferior ranks with the British to serving with the de Gaullist forces?

Why did the review La France Libre take its stand in opposition to the movement of which it should be the spokesman?

One was driven to the inevitable conclusion, said General Odie, that de Gaullism is simply the expression of one man's ambition.

The General's primary intention was to hold himself aloof from all de Gaullist activity, though remaining on polite terms for the sake of French unity. He felt compelled, nevertheless, to state the danger which the de Gaullist movement presented to the general conduct of the war.

Apart from the civil conflict to be foreseen in France, the efforts made to exploit and aggravate the tension existing between Great Britain and Vichy would already have led to war between them had not the United States maintained its representation at Vichy. The danger of such a war persists.

The General realized that in the circumstances he could not close his eyes to quarrels of far more than personal significance. Without joining any party, he therefore listened to the statements of all alike. He also held interviews with such qualified Englishmen as desired to know his opinion, not concealing from them the gravity of the situation nor the urgent necessity to remedy it. On the other hand, he refused such intervention as might have changed his position from that of witness to partisan. In particular he had not felt able to reply to solicitations for the proposal of a solution.

His own reputation, the General believed, might have saved him from charges of ambition or intrigue; but as the guest of the United States he thought it better to remain clear of even the taint of suspicion in regard to a question which touched the interests of the United States as well as of Great Britain.

Accordingly, in English circles he dwelt rather on the material and moral situation of France as they might influence present and future relations, rather than discoursing on the errors of Carlton Garden - a subject that was quite unpleasant to him.

4. First interview with de Gaulle.

The day of his arrival in London, December 12, 1941, Odie had a first interview with General de Gaulle. He was immediately offered the post of Commander-in-Chief of all military, naval, and air forces in Africa.

General Odic pointed out to de Gaulle that he desired no post. To one who had been a high officer of the Legion of Honor and a General for more than five years with an army command during the war, a command of non-existent troops in a secondary theater of operations would risk diminishing his usefulness rather than affirming it. For himself he asked only to be taken into account by the Free French so far as conformed to the propositions that had been made to him in Washington. In that way he hoped to be an anonymous and helpful influence in the American war effort.

Such an action, General Odic maintained, corresponded to the friendship which America, by many signal acts, had held out to France since 1914. It was not, perhaps, the course best calculated to serve his own advantage, but it was enough if his country should be helped thereby to win sympathies of which it would one day have need.

What had concerned General Odic in coming to London was less his own fate than the question of France's resuming her place in the war, when circumstances would at last permit it. He was anxious, therefore, to give formal assurance to de Gaulle that under the proconsulship of General Weygand military and naval bases had been vigorously kept from German hands. That was more important, he maintained, than the

military weight of forces insufficient in number and lacking modern arms. The problem, as he saw it, was to prepare these arms and to create a situation in which they could become effective, rather than to indulge in untimely actions, the outcome of which would be the very thing that all were anxious to avoid - namely, a German occupation.

General deGaulle's reply to this statement was that he did not want Odic to work for the American Government, and that the suggested method of defending North Africa did not correspond to the position which he had taken. General Weygand, like Marshal Petain, was a traitor who ought to be shot.

General Odic realized that there was no further use in explaining his stand. From that moment he was resolved to withdraw as quietly as possible. Odic satisfied himself, therefore, with the reply that he did not share deGaulle's opinion.

5. Second interview with deGaulle

Two days later General Odic met deGaulle again, having established relations, according to deGaulle's request, with the National Committee.

Being asked to give his opinion of the organization, Odic did not hesitate to affirm that the Committee was devoid of figures of any standing, and that it seemed to him in no way representative of France.

General deGaulle was inclined to agree, remarking that it was not his fault if his leadership had not in all cases been followed.

The evidence (as General Odic remarked to Mr. Wiley) made it impossible to accept that reply without reservations. One was led to inquire whether the qualified authorities had not been systematically discarded in the fear of their becoming rivals and whether the formation of the committee had not been determined on the principle that its members should owe everything to the master and be altogether attached to his fortunes.

However that might be, Odic confirmed his refusal of a military command. General deGaulle then informed him that he would give him the head of an important military mission which he was organizing in Washington.

Withholding a definite answer until he could return to the United States, Odic made no objection to the offer.

6. Third Interview with deGaulle

After several informal meetings, during one of which the General issued the demand that no one was ever to say that France had had no alternative but to accept the armistice, Odic had his last interview with deGaulle on February 3.

The question of deGaulle's political orientation being raised, Odic expressed his astonishment that de Gaulle should

not strive to narrow the breaches which were being opened from day to day among the French, and to unite them under the banner of national liberation. Odic made clear the sentiments of high authorities, civil and military, who were sworn enemies of collaboration, and whose present positions in France and North Africa were a bulwark against collaboration, eminently valuable, if not indispensable, to the war effort of the United Nations. He deemed it vital to preserve contact with these men, he said, so that they would be ready, when the time came, to take up the fight at the side of the Free French.

Odic thereupon received what he termed a stupefying answer: "Since you think in this way, you have only to return to Africa and I will make war upon you."

7. L'Affaire Muselier

When General Odic arrived in London he did not see Admiral Muselier who had already left on a cruiser for American waters. According to Odic's version of the affair, Muselier, during his voyage to America, received a telegram from deGaulle ordering him, under threat of penalty, to occupy St. Pierre and Miquelon.

Replying to objections raised by the Admiral, deGaulle affirmed that the occupation order was part of an agreement with England, an agreement which did not in fact exist. The English government, on the contrary, had received assurance that the

enterprise would not be undertaken. That assurance had no value, according to deGaulle, because it was not written.

Enlightened on his return to London as to the origins of the affair, Admiral Muselier considered himself obligated to protest by offering his resignation from the National Committee. He intended, nevertheless, to maintain his command of the naval forces.

The reply of General deGaulle to this gesture of independence on the part of a member of the National Committee was the dismissal of Muselier from his naval command.

Challenged on the regularity of such a move, General deGaulle sentenced Muselier to thirty days imprisonment, seeking assurance from the British that the sentence would be executed. That assurance was not given. The officers of the naval force had in the meantime declared themselves loyal to the Admiral. At the time of General Odic's departure from London more than thirty resignations from the deGaulle movement had already been framed by the London officers.* The General had not been able to verify reports that the protest had spread to the sailors. He was unwilling, moreover, to say anything of events that had occurred since his

* British sources state that actually only four officers resigned from the Free French Naval force.

departure on March 22.

In addition to commenting on the danger to discipline implicit in these manifestations, General Odic revealed his confirmed impression that the English Admiralty was far from being unfavorably inclined toward Muselier. He went so far as to suggest that their friendly attitude toward him implied the following considerations:

a general criticism of the deGaulle movement and its procedures;

approval of Admiral Muselier's demand that the French laws be applied to the deGaulle forces to check a regime of personal decrees;

condemnation of General deGaulle for having bribed the chief code clerk in order to learn the contents of certain telegrams exchanged between Muselier and his chief of staff.

8. The Incident of the Libyan supplies

In England's critical situation, public opinion in London was particularly excited by the report that provisions of war were being sent by the French to Rommel.

General Odic, for his part, considered it likely that Vichy had suffered from a renewed lack of firmness; but he believed the incident was at most a gesture, demanded by Germany as a means of compromising the Vichy government and of foster-

ing the dissensions from which it was hoped that total collaboration would emerge. It was evident, moreover, that the outcome of the operations in Lybia had in no way been determined by such supplies as were sent.

General Odic had been compelled to notice, nevertheless, the policy followed by Carlton Garden on the occasion. In the London press everything possible was done to aggravate British feeling. A report, doubtful in its nature, probably inspired by the Germans, was exploited by every means and used to intensify bitterness between Great Britain and the French people.

9. The Russian broadcast

"Le Broadcast Russe" is the name given by London circles to General deGaulle's radio address of December, delivered at the moment of the difficult situation created by the occupation of St. Pierre and Miquelon.

All parties joined gladly in a tribute to the magnificent Russian resistance and to the will which, during the past twenty years, has made it possible. The uneasiness aroused in London, which certainly was echoed in France, was not caused by this tribute, but by the form of its presentation; silence on the English endurance which had made possible the Russian stand, and implicit condemnation of the democratic tradition of the Western world.

For the light which it throws on General deGaulle's intentions, both in regard to the war and the peace, the "Broadcast Russe" deserves a study beyond the scope of the present discussion.

10. Conclusion

It had not been possible, General Odic concluded, to remain apart from these events. Yet the opinions which he had formed in London were derived from the position of an impartial observer which he had striven to maintain. Today, in the same spirit, he would withhold judgments. He would only add his conviction that the London officials understood the failure of the present French movement, both on the military and political levels. In a large measure they had been responsible for that movement. How, unquestionably, they are seeking a solution.

The extent to which the American Government should concern itself in the problem, General Odic was not prepared to say.

No. S-23

April 22, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

The following is the text of a message sent yesterday by the French Charge d'Affaires at Buenos Aires who replaced the Ambassador there:

"J'ai l'honneur de vous signaler qu'une mission espagnole vient d'arriver a Buenos Ayres pour realiser avec la Republique Argentine des accords de troc d'une part, et des accords concernant l'etablissement d'une ligne aerienne Espagne-Argentine d'autre part."

No. 438

April 22, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

Dr. Carleton Hayes, whom I have known for a good many years, came in to see me yesterday. He had read my memorandum regarding Spain and that general area and wanted to discuss the situation with me. I told him that we would be glad to give him aid in whatever field we could, just as we have done with Mr. MacVeagh.

In view of my long continued feeling that Spain was bound up with the whole South American situation I know it will be of amusement to you that he was told that "it was shameful" that we had done no propaganda work in Spain. I am not going to complain to you about these things.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 23, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

COLONEL DONOVAN

Yes, I approve, if you first
get the approval of the Secretary
or Under Secretary of State.

F. D. R.

No. 439

April 22, 1942

12 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

Two months ago I received an inquiry from a member of the Communist Party in the United States asking if I was willing to accept information from Communist sources as one of their contributions toward the defeat of the Axis. I replied that I would accept information from any American sincerely and loyally on the side of the United States.

I delegated Colonel Buxton to meet their representative, a Mr. Gene Dennis. We learn from other sources that Dennis is a prominent leader in the American Communist Party.

We have received material through this source, some of it foreign intelligence and considerable information concerning various Axis agents here and abroad.

The material relating to subversive activity has been turned over promptly to the FBI, without disclosing the identity of our source, since we have mutually agreed to treat the relationship in a confidential manner until we agree otherwise.

Dennis has made a statement which I regard as sufficiently important to bring to your attention. He states that there

are some 3,000 anti-Axis Spaniards in this hemisphere with whom he is in touch. He has conferred with their leaders and they have requested him to offer the American Government the following plan:

They will furnish two Spaniards as their representatives. They suggest that one man be sent to Spain via Lisbon and the other to France via Marseilles.

These men wish to maintain liaison in Spain and France with our representative now in Lisbon or such representative as we may have in France.

Dennis says further that in Spain they are ready to give us any of the following types of assistance.

1. General and special information.
2. Furnish at our direction, individuals for propaganda, sabotage, or any other special assignment requested.
3. Dennis states flatly that his group could, if given sufficient notice, concentrate and put at the disposal of the United States a trained armed force up to 15,000 men. He says that such a force can be made available promptly in Northern Spanish provinces.

- 3 -

In view of the present situation in France it seems to be desirable to accept these contacts at once and to spot these representatives at the earliest possible date.

Do you approve? I don't need to tell you that time is desperately valuable.

No. 440

April 22, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

I have previously sent you word of our operation in North Africa. Yesterday we received the following word from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"At their meeting on April 20th, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed dispatches received by the Coordinator of Information from Lieutenant Colonel Eddy, Assistant Naval Attache at Tangier, recommending the shipment of military materiel to French Morocco.

"After careful consideration of these dispatches and other pertinent information on the subject, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff viewed unfavorably the proposal to furnish war materials to French Morocco at this time. They are, however, in accord with the policy of expending funds judiciously for the purpose

-2-

of initiating and maintaining guerilla opposition in that area."

In view of this we will have to proceed by the spending of money which I have already advised you we have been doing. I think it most important that we maintain our activity there.

No. 441

April 23, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

Sometime on an afternoon drive would you be interested in seeing something of the special training we have under way? For example:

1. The use of plastics in demolition work.
2. Training in unarmed combat.

We have an instructor who was with the Shanghai police for years and is especially good in that kind of instruction.

We now have 17 men who have graduated from the British schools in SO work and we are making use of them in developing a course of instruction in our own schools.

April 24, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

The following messages were sent by Henri-Hay yesterday:

1. "Le Département d'Etat vient de me faire connaître qu'aucune décision définitive ne pouvait maintenant intervenir en ce qui concerne le transport des militaires et des marins sur le parcours Casablanca-Fort-de France..

"Il en est de même au sujet de la cargaison du Mont-Everest et du départ de ce bâtiment.

"J'ai toutefois le sentiment qu'il ne s'agit que d'une période transitoire de mauvaise humeur. Les Etats-Unis, en effet, tant du fait des garanties que le gouvernement français leur a données et du fait de la présence d'observateurs nombreux aux Antilles, en Afrique occidentale, au Maroc et en Afrique du Nord, un intérêt de premier ordre, encore accru par les considérations militaires, à laisser se rétablir le trafic maritime sans lequel la présence d'observateurs sur nos territoires ne se concevrait plus.

2. "Questionne par les journalistes à sa conférence de presse au sujet des relations franco-américaines M. Cordell Hull s'est contenté de renvoyer ceux-ci aux déclarations qu'ils avait déjà faites l'année dernière au mois de mai, déclarations

que j'avais eu l'occasion de mettre immédiatement au point, par une déclaration faite à la presse.

"Le Secrétaire d'Etat a été, comme d'habitude fort modéré et fort courtois dans ses propos.

"Questionné aujourd'hui sur les démissions de certains membres du personnel de l'Ambassade, M. Cordell Hull s'est contenté de répondre qu'il avait eu l'occasion a maintes reprises, dans le passé, de faire connaître pleinement son opinion au peuple américain."

3. "Dans le discours prononcé par Votre Excellence le 20 avril, je relève des critiques aussi vives qu'elles sont justifiées contre l'effort de guerre des Britanniques.

"Je me permets de signaler à toutes fins utiles, à Votre Excellence que les susceptibilités américaines à l'égard de leurs Alliés sont, pour le moment, des plus vives, surtout dans le monde officiel et plus spécialement dans l'entourage du Président."

No.442

April 24, 1942

12:00 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

We found that charge had been made that our re-broadcast over BBC was British in origin. To counteract any such contention we have taken the following measures.

1. BBC will describe our broadcasts as coming from America by telephone and they will be clearly labeled as "America Calling Finland".

2. In each of the programs rebroadcast in this way, we will use the voice of someone prominent who is known to be in America. Last week we used an actual recording by the most prominent Finnish composer, Tauno Hannikainen, who is at present in Boston and known through Finland to be in the United States.

3. On our short wave programs to Finland in Finnish over WBOS, we are describing the rebroadcast program in an effort to build up an audience for it.

4. We have asked the State Department to communicate to Helsinki the time at which the broadcast will be retransmitted each week so that the daily bulletin of events, issued by the American Legation in Finland, can include mention of it.

This will make it difficult if not impossible to deny that it is not our broadcast.

No. 443

April 24, 1942

12 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

Eve Curie came in to see me yesterday. She has an interesting story, especially concerning Russia where she got to the front, I believe, on four occasions.

You may want to talk with her.

No. 444

April 25, 1942

8:30 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

The following report we have obtained through our source in Sweden, and I thought you might want to read it:

"The upper classes here are very scared of the Soviets, and inclined to feel, were Finland victorious, that she should extend her frontier to Murmansk, thus eliminating any chance of Russia's creating a lapp state. More informed people feel, however, that Russia must necessarily dominate the Eastern Baltic. 'Stalin' (by Gren) is much read in Stockholm. He feels the Soviet leader is an ambitious man, who might agree to a negotiated peace if that were necessary to keep him in power. In that case, the Russian army might lose heart as in 1918.

"So far as France is concerned, people here don't think Laval will succeed in conciliating public opinion.

As for Bulgaria, there is a great conviction that Boris will send few, if any, soldiers to the Eastern Front.

"From Germany, there is much loose talk about our President, now that he has gotten control over Britain wanting to secure the mastery of the whole earth. Also there is a hope that with the Nazis gone, Germany might be able to unite with the Allies to defeat the Asiatics.

"With terrific casualties, and food shortages getting worse (with no help expected from the Ukraine for a long time), morale is sagging in Germany. There is no talk about invading Britain. The hope is to drag the war on to a stalemate by breaking through the blockade by way of either Suez or the Caspian Sea. If this is not done this year, Germany's situation will be really serious. There is a great feeling that Britain is wasting her time in bombing France and Germany, when the real issue is whether the Russian and Libyan fronts will be able to hold. There is also the feeling that Allied forces are spread too thin. The outcome of the next few months' operations will be awaited with the greatest tension and anxiety here."

No. 445

April 25, 1942

8:30 A. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

The following information has been received from a Norwegian who escaped from Norway on February 17, 1942. He is considered to be completely trustworthy.

"Food conditions not as serious as usually believed; little danger of premature revolts because people recognize necessity of waiting; underground still operating successfully; British Commando attacks not popular because of reprisals and useless destruction; Quisling membership small and despised even by the Germans; very small per cent of the people still have radios but most of the population still get news through regular underground newspapers; wages high but no foreign labor; German troops in Bergen vicinity about 8000, morale very low; present troops are untrained, either very young or middle aged; very few planes in Bergen area but coast defenses and patrols are strong; believes present Norwegian Government-in-Exile will have to resign at end of war; Oscar Torp perhaps only minister that is popular enough to remain; Germans are raising a cruiser and repairing a destroyer in Bergen harbor; they are also turning out a corvette every two weeks at a factory in Bergen; maps showing important places mentioned in report are attached."

No. 446

April 25, 1942

8:30 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

The following is the British Political Warfare Executive weekly analysis of German home propaganda dated April 23, 1942:

"Although military events at present are on a much grander scale than formerly, Hitler's birthday was played up as intensively as in 1940 and 1941. The line which Goebbels touched in 1940 but not in 1941: 'the Lonely Fuehrer' was revived on a much greater scale. To this was added 'the suffering Fuehrer' with the result of a picture of 'a Christ who suffers only for Germans'. Hitler was not widely described as infallible this year. No comparisons were drawn with 1941. Much was said about Hitler as 'the Savior of Germany', but little about New Order in Europe and the World.

"Directives about Russia are: (a) Emphasize that large-scale operations are impossible right now because of thaw conditions; (b) As to where or when offensive will take place, avoid making any exact suggestions.

"Main lines on subject of Allied offensive are: (a) While they are still engaged in Russia, Germans have nothing to fear from a second front; (b) largely because of shipping shortage Britain cannot launch an offensive; (c) if offensive is launched by Britain, it will be a concession reluctantly given to Soviet pressure and will be undertaken with no regard to strategic considerations and destined to instant disaster; (d) British aerial offensive dismissed as costly propaganda raids lacking any military value; (e) to describe fortifications on European coast new phrase Wilkingerburgen has been coined.

"Directives regarding the Mediterranean are: (a) in this major theatre of war Britain is on the defensive because (b) German air and submarine attack rather than Italian fleet action.

"Probably because of lack of interest among Germans very little emphasis is placed on Britain's unfavorable world strategic situation. This week there is very little attention to India. Raids on Japan minimized. About China there is almost a complete blank.

"On subject of France, Germans are told: (a) in the government there has been a big change; (b) Laval, who is moderately praised, holds top position; (c) France is thereby given an opportunity to become more constructive. No representation that

- 3 -

a change of heart has come over French people.

"Neither the shooting of hostages at Rouen nor Quisling's ultimatum to Norwegian teachers mentioned."

No. 447

April 25, 1942

8:30 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

You will remember that the day I returned home from the Middle East, I said this to you: "Unless what I say is understood, the fight of the small nations of this world will not be understood. While these small nations look upon Churchill as the great defender, they look upon you as the great liberator". As an example, I told you of being in the front positions of the Greek soldiers and on the forward positions of the Albanian Mountains, and in each of those positions, whether the men were with the artillery or in the dugouts or in the hospitals, on each occasion they gave three cheers for Greece, three cheers for America and three cheers for Roosevelt. It is with that in mind that I am sending you a memorandum prepared by one of our men and sent to me, which I attach hereto.

WAR OF LIBERATION

The President has asked for a name for this struggle, which embraces its significance and at the same time marks the distinction between this and the World War.

The words "War of Liberation" suggest themselves instinctively and the more the words are analyzed the more appropriate the name becomes.

The submerged states of Europe, including France, are living on the hope of liberation. The clandestine newspaper of France is called "Liberation". The U.S.S.R. is fighting for the liberation of its territory from foreign invasion. The Anglo-Saxon peoples are fighting to be liberated from the fear of predatory powers without scruple. In the Far East, we have promised independence to the Philippine people, Cripps has promised it to the Indians; the struggle to resist Japan therefore becomes for these lands as for China, truly a war of liberation.

To the German minds as well, the words "War of Liberation" has a special significance. The magnificent struggle of Prussia in 1806 under Stein and Hardenberg, is a period of history of which every German is proud. Germany pulled itself out of despair and humiliation by its own boot-straps, by a conscious national effort which became known as the "Befreiungskrieg"-the "War of Liberation". Perhaps at long last this war as well can be for them a war of liberation, liberation from Nazi gangs and Nazi control.

Up to the present, the United Nations have lacked a unified platform; resistance to aggression, fear of the armed might of Germany and Japan, these things are not enough, they are too negative, they typify only too well the piecemeal and ineffectual resistance of the early days of the struggle. The word "democracy" has only limited appeal, to large sections of the world it is "a dream and not even a beautiful dream". The rights of the individual are of far more importance to the Anglo-Saxon and Western-European, than to the other enormous sections of the world.

But the word "liberation" appeals to all. Whatever the peculiarities of the people, they want to be liberated from foreign control and from fear. It is a dynamic word - it typifies the result of each foot of advance we make - liberation follows in our wake. Our disparate nations and peoples can unite on this thesis, not only unite, but march in Crusade, inspired by a positive, vital and dynamic conception.

I need not point out the propaganda advantages of such a slogan, nor the innumerable changes that could be rung in variation of its many aspects.

No. 448

April 25

8:30 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

I thought you would be interested in the following quotation from "Moscow War Diary", by Alexander Werth, a British war correspondent, in his book dealing with the Russian war just published. It can be found at page 103:

"Much depends on whether, after the war, the Comintern will be allowed to play any part in European affairs. It has seldom done Russia's national policy any good, and often a lot of harm, notably in Germany and France, and has played into the hands of Fascists and reactionaries. But the Comintern is one thing, and Sovietism is another. The post-war competition (and the ultimate choice for Poles, Czechs, and even Germans) may be not between capitalism and Communism, but between two forms of democracy - capitalist democracy and Soviet democracy (with a progressive application of the Stalin Constitution). Here there is room for give-and-take, and for rapprochement between these ideologies. It is important to prevent a clash, and to prevent rivalries in Europe over the adherence of this or that country to one of the two ideologies. The social regimes of both England and Russia are going to evolve in the course of this war; they may become very similar in many respects, with Britain becoming more 'socialist' (in the wide sense of the word) and Russia adopting more and more of those democratic liberties which her people would welcome and which they will expect from a full peace-time application of the Stalin Constitution. Perhaps the real difficulty will be America, which may, for a long time, still persist in being stubbornly capitalist.

"What would be fatal to the future peace of Europe would be any sort of return by Russia to international Trotskyism, and any attempt to trotskize Germany. It would be a boomerang. In a few years Germany would go Nazi again and start another war. But I think the Russians are becoming increasingly aware of the real nature of the German problem. Even with the Poles there shouldn't be much disagreement on that point."

At page 108 he discusses the visit of Harry Hopkins
and the statement made by Harry.

No. 449

April 24, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

This report, covering highlights of the week's war on the propaganda front, is based on recording of shortwave broadcasts at FCC's listening posts in Washington and Portland, Oregon; the Columbia Broadcasting System's listening posts in San Francisco and New York; on medium wave broadcasts recorded by the British Broadcasting Corporation, and by our own monitors.

We battered the Axis on virtually all sectors of the fourth front this week.

Last week we wrenched the initiative from them for the first time, outsmarting them and turning the tables in the opening battle of the spring war of nerves; this week we retained and exploited that initiative.

The Axis remained on the defensive, and while our position was aggressive and positive, theirs was negative. The situation was reversed--we became the propagandists, they became the counter-propagandists.

The main Axis line was identical with their line of last week: an invasion of Europe is impossible.

But this week the entire Axis emphasis was on alleged United Nations weak points--there was none of the usual talk of strength of the Axis.

That was the highlight of the week's war of the mind.

WHAT THE ENEMY DID

The argument most strongly advanced by the Axis to prove an invasion of Europe is impossible was United Nations shipping shortages. Success of the Axis submarine campaign was stressed. It was variously claimed that Britain and the U. S. had lost half their tonnage available at the start of the war, that the Axis had sunk 1,176,000 tons of merchant shipping in the past few months, that U-boats had sunk 500,000 tons of shipping in the past two weeks, that 800,000 tons had been sunk since April 1, that U-boats had sunk 213 ships. Harry Hopkins was quoted as saying the tonnage problem was critical.

Other arguments for the line were: lack of Allied sea power and air strength, which would entail "a loss of 50 per cent of shipping" in an invasion attempt; inability to weaken fronts in Mediterranean, India and the British Isles; England's defensive attitude; disunity between Britain and the U. S.; lack of American equipment and "poor" American performance in the last war, indicating we would also do badly this time.

The impossibility of an invasion of Europe was dragged into innumerable Axis shows with no legitimate news event as a basis for comment. Such points were made as the talk of invasion was merely a publicity stunt; it was intended to divert as many Axis troops as possible from the Eastern front; American

troops would not be involved but British boys might be exterminated for Bolshevism.

The two main news pegs for the line were the Marshall-Hopkins visit and the commando raid at Boulogne.

Comment on the Marshall-Hopkins visit ran: they came to discuss Stalin's "ultimatum" for a second front; they tried to dissuade Britain from an invasion attempt; they tried to persuade the British to try an invasion; the Englishmen who returned with Marshall came to sign away another part of the British economic system.

Not until Thursday did the Axis let go with everything on the commando raid. It was then said that the raid was a complete failure; it proved the British cannot invade the continent; no objectives were attained; it was an ignominious answer to Stalin's plea for a second front and Hitler's "invaton" for an invasion; a considerable amount of arms and equipment was left on the beach.

The Axis propagandists gave the impression that we needed a second front but were frightened at the "certain defeat" the attempt would entail. The Axis spent much time "persuading" us the attempt would result in catastrophe and that all other defeats would be dwarfed by it. Some stations warned anti-Germans in threatened areas that "irresponsible acts" would bring immediate death.

It is obvious that the Axis had an extremely severe case of the jitters.

There was no Axis talk of an offensive against the United Nations in any part of the world. In fact, Berlin denied an offensive against Russia had been promised for April or any other month. It modestly claimed to have said merely that when the offensive did start the world would know it. A safe statement.

The second most important Axis propaganda item of the week was based on the bombing of Japanese cities.

The line on the bombing dove-tailed in part with the line that an invasion of Europe is impossible. For the Axis, on the defensive, declared that this "minor and ineffectual bombing" proves we cannot start an offensive in the Far East.

Axis handling of the bombing was inept. Its story was inconsistent, incomplete, confusing.

On Friday Tokyo radio denied a "Reuter Report" that Tokyo had been bombed by three Allied planes. "No bomb has ever fallen on Japanese soil", Tokyo declared. At 12:24 EWT Saturday morning Tokyo announced the bombing.

First nine planes were reported downed; then only "about ten" planes were said to have executed the bombing and "some" were said to have escaped, while none were claimed downed. "Telling" damage was first said to have been inflicted on "schools and hospitals"; then the damage was said to have been "slight". The planes, it was indicated in the same breath, were based on carriers "far off" the Japanese coast and on the Chinese mainland. Some Axis radios said there were casualties; others said there were no casualties. All agreed no military installations were hit.

But Japanese Home Minister Yuzaka let the cat out of the bag. In an important statement he indicated that the bombing had caused considerable civilian panic and concern for the future. When he vigorously denied the threat of more bombings would force the imperial diet elections to be cancelled or postponed, Yuzaka's speech showed unmistakably that the European end of the Axis does not have a monopoly on the jitters.

Axis line on the bombing was: it was inhuman; in defiance of international law; the bombs were dropped indiscriminately on homes, schools, hospitals; air defense functioned perfectly; Japanese not frightened but angered; U.S. planes never reached Tokyo proper; it was a propaganda stunt; it raised Japanese morale; it will be avenged and "the American nation must now be prepared to suffer the consequences; Japanese war might is going to retaliate"; showed American weakness, since it was meant to quiet public opinion over defeats in the Far East; Americans indignant over bombing of schools and upset, fearing their own coasts will be bombed; it was a failure and any talk that this is the beginning of an American offensive is, strictly speaking, a fairy tale.

However, by the end of the week the puzzled Japanese, via Tokyo radio, were fishing for information. One broadcast said the Americans had made no report of the bombing because there were no survivors. Another broadcast said: "If these authorities cannot make such an announcement the U. S. will deserve all the criticism that the entire propaganda regarding the effect of the

recent air raid is all nonsense."

The Axis spent some time during the week giving Laval a build up. Vichy went to considerable lengths to praise him warmly and lavishly. Vichy emphasized that despite Leahy's recall a break with the U. S. was not likely. The Axis used the Anti-Bolshevik and pro-Nazi parts of Laval's speech. It ignored Leahy's recall.

Berlin and Rome agreed that the Laval government was an Axis victory, but stated that the causes and consequences of the situation are not clear. They cautiously said it represents a "certain evolution" in the French political situation.

Throughout the week the Axis stressed the number of Allied planes downed. The RAF was repeatedly said to have lost large numbers of aircraft. Russia was said to have lost 20,476 planes. In the Far East many allied planes were also reported lost.

Cannibalism in Russia was said to be on the increase.

The Germans were said to be gaining on the Eastern front and to hold the initiative at all points.

Shooting of French hostages, Russian successes and Chinese successes in Burma were ignored.

Much noise was made re Hitler's birthday.

Berlin said of the station the COI uses: "No other radio in the world is so bad as Cincinnati."

WHAT WE DID

American short-wave radios concentrated their fire on the bombing of Japanese cities, the war of nerves relative to an invasion of Europe and the Laval government combined with the latest

surge of unrest in France.

For the first day or two the handling of the bombing of Japan was confused. Some stations gave the straight Japanese version, even quoting the "schools and hospitals" line without qualification. Lack of confirmation from Washington contributed to the confused treatment of the story by American stations.

But by Monday we were doing an excellent job, stressing the confusion and contradictions in the Axis version of what happened and using liberal quotations. American policy by then was clearly stated: mum's the word.

By Tuesday a definite war of nerves technique had been developed in handling the story. It remained the main news. The line played was that all Axis reports were confused and betrayed dismay, whereas we weren't going to help them a bit in solving the mystery that puzzled them. Our programs mentioned these possibilities as bases for the planes that executed the bombing: carriers, China, secret points in the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, the Aleutian Islands. There was no speculation about the use of bases in Russia.

We continued to jab the Axis on the question of an invasion of Europe by using every possible peg to hang a story on that would tell Europeans we were thinking in terms of striking out at the continent and not of waiting for the war to come to us.

Main pegs were: Marshall-Hopkins return, which we exploited to the full, commenting that the visit had caused the Axis much worry; German troop concentrations in Norway; Runstedt organization of cyclist units to resist commando raids; the commando raid at Boulogne; the seizure of cement in France to build up coastal defenses, etc.

Nazi fear and jitters over an invasion were repeatedly stressed.

Laval continued to be richly and profusely abused throughout the week. Laval's and Petain's speeches were used by all stations with the stress on the inconsistencies and lies in them. Laval was described on most shows as a quisling, who would have no more success in pacifying the French and winning them over to the Axis than his counterpart, the Norwegian Gauleiter, had had.

Leahy's recall was predicted several hours before it was officially announced.

The stations also concentrated on the situation in France; the riots, train-wrecking, attacks on German soldiers, shooting of hostages. All the aspects of unrest in France were played frequently. The resignation of the officials of the French Embassy in Washington was also used to good effect. All the stations emphasized Hull's statement on France.

The general impression given of the naval situation was that the U. S. is angry but confident of United Nations striking power and our forthcoming victory.

News of the Russian front was used by all stations. Russian successes against the Finns, in the central sector and at Bryansk were stressed.

The RAF raids were also a prominent daily item in our broadcasts.

We plugged the Chinese gains in Burma without, of course, building up hope of a United Nations victory there. .

All in all, we had the jump on the Axis daily. Even Goebbels, if he had a moment of honesty, would grant that this round was ours with plenty to spare.

No. 450

April 25, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

The following is the British Ministry of Warfare Weekly Propaganda Digest.

1. Germany: For hoarding, destroying, or withholding raw materials vital to needs of population a new decree provides heavy terms of imprisonment at hard labor.
2. Italy: Because of a) balking by industrialists; b) dependence on imports from countries which fix prices without regard to internal Italian legislation, efforts at price control are failing. From July to December 1941 average price of a shirt rose from 50 to 100 lira, of a pair of socks from 8 to 18 lira.
3. France: Food supplies so short in large towns during March that mass street demonstrations occurred in Montpellier, Sete, and Lyons. Crowds shouted for meat, milk, and bread. Thousands of women sent deputations to mayors and signed petitions. Shops were looted in some cases.
4. Belgium: Todt organization constructing concrete walls. Along entire Atlantic coast there is great activity in the building of fortifications. More than one half total French cement production, now running at about 2,500,000 tons, earmarked

-2-

for this purpose by Germans.

No.451

April 25, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

The following is the British Home Intelligence Report for the week ending April 22.

1. Public feeling in its present state is less susceptible than ever to assessment. Sense of detachment from war reported by four regions, while "more lively interest in both home news and news from abroad" found in three regions. Expectancy continues. Spirits rising slightly because of:
(a) Tokyo bombing, which was termed "best news we have had for months"; (b) budget, which was generally accepted as "fair and sound, attuned to general demand for austerity"; (c) the "non-offensive" of the RAF over the continent. A "real kick" to everybody; (d) good weather.
2. Ranged against this slight improvement are the continued anxiety over Burma and the uncertainty and disgust occasioned by Laval's return to dominance. But these are out-balanced by former factors.
3. Tokyo raids brought forth a "wave of exultation" and the hope that "Americans will give them more of this". "Tide is turning in this area and American activity is increasing."

4. Little comment on Russia. One report comes from Scotland, "Growing minority turning away from Russia, as it is felt by 'anti-second-fronters' that Maisky, Litvinov, and others have not been helpful to Allies in stimulating impossible demand for second front."

5. Regarding war in West. "Great scale" of recent bombings of Italy and Germany has caused satisfaction. Admiration evoked by Augsburg raid, but opinion divided on question of whether "such losses are or are not worth while."

6. Regarding Government: little criticism or mention.

7. War strain being felt by middle-aged people, what with such new burdens as longer working hours, home guard duties, care of evacuees, etc.

No. 452

April 27, 1942

12 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

Frank Knox was in to see me yesterday. He told me two things that I must write you about.

1. That you had been good enough to express concern that as the result of my accident I would be unable to go into the field. He will tell you himself that he was present while I was being checked up by the doctor and that the doctor said I will be fully recovered and in shape to do whatever may be required. In point of fact, I probably have had a rest I would not otherwise have had. I am grateful for your solicitude, and I assure you there is nothing permanently wrong.

2. He told me that the by now well worn lie had been retailed to you that I had or have some ninety representatives or observers of my organization in Latin America. The repetition of this story makes me

angry and indignant, not so much for myself, because I have only contempt for the people who will retail such deliberate falsehoods, but because you should be annoyed by such stories. This has been one of several instances where an attempt has been made to assert that I have gone into a field which you have not allocated to me. This story is just as untrue as the others. Welles wrote me about it, and I attach his letter, together with my reply. You should know me well enough to know that I do adhere strictly to my orders and make no attempt to encroach upon the jurisdiction of anyone else. A zealous impulse would be no excuse. I assure you that your real concern must be with those who bring such stories to you about men who are trying to serve you loyally, because this tale is a dirty and contemptible lie. I have no representatives in that section of the world and never have had, and all those concerned must know that to be true. I know that you will recognize that my anger is justified at such deliberate and continued falsehoods.

No. 453

April 27, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

Ever since the Laval appointment and the developments here in the French Embassy we have been endeavoring to maintain contact with the Embassy people here. We have made no direct contacts but have kept ourselves advised through a certain source which we established several months ago. The thing we are anxious to get is the special secret codes and ciphers. This we are negotiating for. I cannot promise that we will get it, but we will try.

In the French Consulate in New York there are eight career men. Of these eight the first appears to adhere to his job. Number Two is regarded by the others as a German agent. Numbers Three, Four and Five are decidedly anti-Laval. They are in contact with our people. We

are inclined to believe that there is no valuable material in the safe at the Consulate, but the number Three man thinks that such material does exist. He is desirous of ousting the other crowd and taking possession. We have refused to have any part in this. We have fully advised the State Department and in accordance with its desires we are maintaining our contact with these people.

To me there is a deep significance in what is happening in the Embassy here and in the Consulate. I think it is some evidence that there is disintegration in their Foreign Service due to the intervention of Laval. If this is true, then I think it is an indication that it might be possible for us, by penetration, to get further information that would discover the purposes of Laval. It must be handled with great care and discretion and I dislike to let anyone know, but I feel that you and Mr. Hull should be advised.

I do not want to do anything that will jeopardize the work we are carrying on in North Africa. In

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accordance with the desires of the Joint Chiefs of Staff we are sending no material from here but I am trying to arrange for necessary articles to move from Gibraltar.

No. 454

April 27, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

Our Intelligence group sent to me the attached map recently put on sale in New York. You will notice that it may well be a kind of subtle propaganda to which our censorship people may not be alive. This map was called to our attention by Czech intelligence. You will notice that this is ostensibly published by a Jewish organization; also you will notice the immense territorial extent it gives to us . . and to Russia. We are following this up and will let you know the results.

No. 455

April 28, 1942

12:00 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

1. The following is from the British Political Warfare Executive German Weekly Directive.

2. "Policy:

a. Inside Germany. In news matter we should confine ourselves to factual reportage, personnel changes, decrees, etc. Watch for items which will illustrate Sauckel's manpower crisis.

b. France. Avoid mere abuse of Laval; vague statements that all France is against him; emphasize that the new government is proof of: First, Germany's fear of intervention in the West; second, Germany's need of foreign labor.

3. Strategy:

a. Be careful to stick to innuendo when mentioning our western front intervention threat. The Germans are talking of "Wikingersburgen" on the west. However, such fortifications are as outdated as the Maginot line. RAF offensive and Commando raids should still be described as the first stage of our offensive action.

b. Be careful not to over inflate the Russian local

attacks. We can assume that the German spring offensive will not start for several weeks.

4. Military points:

a. Malta. We can state that Malta's resistance has already delayed the spring offensive by diverting Kesselring's forces.

b. Yugoslavia. Some seventeen Italian divisions are now contained by the Yugoslav army, not to mention Bulgarian, Hungarian or German--in all, some thirty divisions.

5. Naval points:

a. Continue to emphasize Germany's need to break our communications with Murmansk. The Tirpitz, etc. still inactive at Trondheim. The Gneisenau was damaged so seriously that she has now been towed to Gdynia for repairs where she lies alongside the Graf Zeppelin, still incomplete. The Scharnhorst is also in dry dock.

b. Lay off U-boats sinking stories and expose German sinking claims.

6. Air Points:

a. It is possible to assume that the Luftwaffe is feeling the pinch both in personnel and in machines because: first, wastage of machines in Russia because of climatic conditions, poor runways, low efficiency of flying personnel owing to overwork,

inadequate aids to landing at night; second, forced landings due to using aircraft which has exceeded normal first line life and aircraft not serviced with usual completeness.

b. Many units had less than half their strength towards the end of 1941. The reserves have been swallowed up in less than six months. The results of this shortage have been: first, the number of dive bomber units has been reduced to two-thirds of June, 1940. Until late in March no dive bombers could be spared for Malta and since then there have been only enough to contribute less than ten per cent of the total effort. Second, for months the raids on Moscow have had only a nuisance effect. Third, it has been necessary to use first line bomber aircraft for transport work. Fourth, owing to a shortage of ME 110, twin engine day-fighter units have been disbanded to expand night-fighters.

No. 456

April 28, 1942

12:00 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

The following is from the British Political Warfare Executive Weekly French Directive:

"1. The French fleet:

a. Do not comment on French warships, either on their dispositions or the possible use of them. Do not go out of your way to attack Darlan. There may be some significance in the omissions in his Order of the Day and letter of resignation. Avoid referring to Darlan as Commander in Chief of the French Navy. Insist on the way the Germans are exploiting the economic resources of the French colonies and the French merchant fleet. Any discussion of Madagascar should be avoided.

2. France:

a. Police measures. Undoubtedly Laval is concentrating on a cleanup. It is expected that there will be a comprehensive purge among Darlan's former administrative collaborators. In unoccupied France the police are to be reorganized by Bousquet. The Paris police force is asking for further recruits. Before he makes any further steps toward selling out, Laval is making sure of his internal position.

b. RNP is to extend its organization to the unoccupied zone. Deat's forces will be put at Laval's disposal. The attempt to form a "Partie de la Revolution National" should be shown up as a

trick on the part of Laval to suppress all other organizations, even those which support the Marshal.

c. The present government is little more than a "half-way house" towards a full collaborationist government. Moysset and Barthelemy are not likely to last long. It should be pointed out that the cabinet is full of second class men who were deliberately chosen to cover the first period while Laval gets full control of all the reins of government. Eventually Laval, having served his usefulness, will also be discarded by the Germans.

d. The Germans are being discreet about Laval. Only after he has shown himself a good servant will they make concessions.

e. Laval will probably get in touch with Germans in a higher place than Abetz. The position of Petain in 1942 is the same as that of Hindenburg in 1933.

3. Emphasize:

- a. The distinction between Laval and the French people.
- b. Although Laval is afraid of the French people, he flatters himself that he can double cross them. He is therefore proceeding in two states, first, temporary acceptance of Darlan's military position and Marshal's "cover", second, gradual purge of Vichy's "old guard".
- c. While Germany undertakes the spring campaigns, she requires that France be ruled by a man whose future is bound up with hers.
- d. Petain has been reduced by Laval to a mere figurehead. Point out all Laval's efforts to cover himself by the Marshal's formal authority. Petain will not know what Laval is planning; he has no control over internal policy.

e. Frenchmen who have been serving Vichy through self interest or under the illusion that they have been serving France must now be disillusioned. They must now know that Laval is to them an implacable enemy. There is no longer the appearance of a "buffer" between Germany and the people of France.

f. The fact that both these factions are their enemies will now be apparent to the people of France."

No. 457

April 28, 1942

12 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

Ambassador Winant came to see me yesterday with the idea of having us do some work with him in England on the pamphlet and publications end. He said they know very little about us; that he has taken the matter up with the Secretary of State and would like for us to send a man or two who could be of immediate service to him in his work. I told him we would be glad to do it and I am already getting in touch with Mr. Wallace Carroll at his suggestion.

No. 458

April 28, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

The following information comes through the British Ministry of Information as to Axis intentions deduceable from propaganda.

"1. There are positive indications for the first time that they may be contemplating the use of chemical warfare.

2. The Berlin dispatch to the Norwegian Attenposten asserts that the problem is being discussed particularly in regard to the summer campaign on the eastern front where weather conditions and terrain are favorable. The dispatch says 'The German army is prepared and the German chemical industry guarantees that it will be very dangerous for the enemy if they begin gas warfare. The chemical factories have been working at high pressure. The Germans say they have the advantage'.

The reference made by Hitler on April 26 to possible English use of 'neue mittel' is regarded with suspicion."

No. 459

April 28, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

The following is taken from the British Empire Guidance on Hitler's speech.

"1. The resolution confirming Hitler's full powers is the final ratification by Hitler of a series of recent decrees strengthening S.S. and the party at the expense of the generals, civil service and business.

2. The series of decrees indicates the concern felt by the party over the growth of dissident elements. For the moment the decrees strengthen the party's hands, but only at the cost of increased tension.

3. Note that this formal resolution is the first of its kind since July 7, 1934, when the Reichstag was asked to approve the Roehm murders. The measure of concern with which Hitler views the internal situation is demonstrated by this clinging to quasi-democratic procedure."

No. 460

April 28, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

The State Department has informed us that the Irish Foreign Minister has now notified us that they are ready for a full-scale American publicity campaign. The Minister has recommended to the State Department the setting up of a competent newspaper woman who understands Irish affairs, and has recommended Helen Kirkpatrick of the Chicago Daily News staff in London. I know her as a competent reporter, although Frank Knox may not be willing to let her go.

The suggestion was made that LIFE, LOOK, and other similar illustrated magazines be put on sale in Ireland at 6¢ per copy. Also that 10,000 copies of the Irish Supplement of the NATION be supplied for distribution to a selected list of teachers, doctors, clergy and hierarchy.

It is also suggested that we might have a daily rebroadcast to Ireland through the BBC in London.

I have told our people who have charge of foreign publications to work closely with the State Department and, of course, whatever is done will be done with their cooperation.

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April 28, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

The following is the text of a message sent yesterday from Vichy to the Ambassador here:

"Veuillez protester auprès de M. Cordell Hull contre le débarquement de troupes américaines en Nouvelle Calédonie, annoncé par un communiqué officiel du Département de la Guerre des Etats-Unis.

"Le Communiqué en question ajoute que les troupes américaines participeront à la défense de l'île, ayant été envoyées à la Nouvelle-Calédonie avec l'approbation des autorités locales.

"Vous rappellerez à M. Cordell Hull que, même si quelques français rebelles à leur patrie se sont emparés de l'île en septembre 1940, ce fait n'autorise pas les Etats-Unis à débarquer des troupes dans cette possession française. De Gaulle et ses représentants n'ont aucune autorité pour parler au nom de la France.

"Vous marquerez au Secrétaire d'Etat que le Gouvernement français est particulièrement blessé par le passage du communiqué officiel disant que le débarquement des troupes américaines a été approuvé par la population locale.

"La France, dans sa détresse, est dans l'impossibilité de défendre par les armes l'intégrité de ses possessions. Elle n'en est que plus fondée à réclamer l'observance par les Etats-Unis des engagements pris à son égard, et concernant le respect de l'intégrité des possessions françaises dans le monde.

"La France, au surplus, est en droit de compter sur l'amitié traditionnelle du peuple américain pour qu'il ne soit point porté atteinte à sa souveraineté. "LAVAL".

The text of the Ambassador's reply is as follows:

"J'ai l'honneur de vous communiquer par télégramme le texte de la note de protestation que j'ai l'intention de remettre mercredi au Département d'Etat. Ce texte est conforme à celui du télégramme 1022. J'ai toutefois supprimé l'avant-dernier paragraphe (La France, dans sa détresse, est dans l'impossibilité de défendre par les armes l'intégrité de ses possessions). En effet, en présence des campagnes de presse et de radio essayant de justifier une occupation préventive de Madagascar, j'ai préféré supprimer ces deux lignes sur lesquelles on pourrait ici essayer de trouver une excuse à un coup de force contre notre colonie."

Note: I have been informed that the Ambassador has stated privately that he feels confident that France will be able to defend her possessions.

No. 461

April 28, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

Attached is a pamphlet (this particular one in French) just prepared by us for issuance in English-speaking countries and in such other countries as it will seem feasible, to use after proper translation.